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I.  Introduction 
 
 This paper analyses the economic performance of the thirteen countries generally 
defined as comprising East, Central and Southern Africa (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Burundi, Malawi, Rwanda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Botswana, Lesotho, 
Swaziland and South Africa).  The purpose of the paper is to inspect the extent to which 
these countries show convergence in their macroeconomic variables, and whether the 
relatively strong growth performances in the 2000s might be sustained. 
 The paper presents an analytical framework, then provides empirical evidence on 
macroeconomic outcome and policy convergence, highlight pertinent international 
experiences and summarize the debate on the cons and pros of macroeconomic 
convergence.  It uses country-level data, covering members of the main regional 
economic communities in Eastern, Central and Southern Africa (the Southern African 
Development Community, SADC, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, 
COMESA, and the East African Community, EAC) to assess macroeconomic 
convergence in the sub-regions.  In addition to examining the trends and constraints to 
macroeconomic convergence, the study reviews policies affecting macroeconomic 
convergence in Eastern and Southern Africa. 
 Section II of the paper presents the analytical framework, which specifies the link 
between policy and outcomes, developed within the standard national accounting 
framework, following the lead of Geda’s seminal paper (Geda 2001).  A central 
conclusion is that factors beyond the control of policymakers are so great that they create 
substantial indeterminacy between policy instruments and outcomes.  The third section 
considers the empirical evidence, which shows mixed results with regard to outcome 
convergence, as well as raising questions with regard to the sustainability of the relatively 
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strong regional growth in the 2000s.  The final section reviews policy measures for 
sustained growth and poverty reduction (pro-poor growth). 
 Policy harmonisation, defined as the implementation of cross-country rules and 
practice on policy goals and instruments, is not considered in this paper, because it 
requires a detailed review of institutional arrangements among the countries.  For the 
purpose of the present study, macroeconomic convergence refers to outcomes, the 
manifestation of policy and non-policy factors in macroeconomic variables.   
 
II.  Analytical Framework 
 
 In his study on fiscal policy harmonisation for the ECA, Geda notes that from the 
early 1980s the spread of stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes in the sub-
Saharan region resulted in similar macro policies by governments: 
The adoption of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) starting in mid 1980s in 
almost all African countries has led to openly adopting a liberalization (open 
economy) policy. The identical nature of policy instruments prescribed by 
International Financial Institutions across countries in the continent implies a de 
facto macro policy harmonization, at least at the level of intent. (Geda 2001, 4) 
 Implicit in the quotation are the ambiguities associated with both the concept and 
practice of policy convergence, and for policy harmonisation.  The convergence of trade 
regimes across countries is perhaps the easiest to assess empirically, on the basis of 
numerical measures of tariff rates, coverage of quotas, and related indicators.  Much more 
difficult to assess is the convergence of fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies, 
because apparently similar policies can be quite different in their practical 
implementation, as we shall see. 
 To organise the analysis of outcome convergence we begin with the national 
income identity where C is private consumption, I is private investment, G is total 
government expenditure, X is exports, N is imports, and T is total public revenue. 
 Y = C + I + G + (X - N) 
 C = a(Y - T) 
 N = b(Y - T) - cE 
 T = tY 
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 I = Io - fR 
 X = Xo + hE 
 Y = a(1 - t)Y  
 Y = a(1 - t)Y + (Io - fR) + G + (Xo + gE) - [b(1 - t)Y - cE] 
 Y = [(Io - fR) + G + Xo + E(h - c)]/[1 - (a - b)(1 - t)] 
 Where q = 1/[1 - (a - b)(1 - t)] is the multiplier and the policy variables are: 
 G = government expenditure 
 t = marginal tax rate 
 R = central bank rate, assumed to equal the market interest rate 
 E = nominal exchange rate 
 Holding the tax rate constant in order to avoid a quadratic equation and assuming 
the parameters Io and Xo constant, the rate of growth of GDP is:
1 
(1) y = q[Gg – I,RIr + (X,E -  TN,E)be] +  
 The lower case letters y, r and e are the proportional rates of change of GDP, the 
central bank rate and the nominal exchange rate.  The Greek letters  are elasticities, with 
the relevant variables noted in subscripts.  The Greek letter G is the initial ratio of 
government expenditure to GDP, I the ratio of investment to GDP, and T the ratio of 
imports to exports.  Since the marginal propensity to import is equal to the average, N/Y 
= b.  The change in government expenditure takes a positive sign, as does the exchange 
rate because N,E is negative.   The interest rate impact is always negative, by raising the 
cost of investment.  On the assumption that the multiplier and the parameters within the 
brackets are stable, the symbol  incorporates all non-policy factors, such as changes in 
international prices, weather-related shocks and policy changes in other countries. 
 If we assume that an economy has a stable structure of behavioural relationships, 
differences in growth rates among the thirteen countries covered by this study can be 
organised into three broad categories, changes in policy instruments (G, R and E), 
                                                 
1 The algebra is simple, albeit tedious:  first, take the total differential of Y and divide through by 
Y to obtain y = Y/Y on the left hand side;  second, multiply each term in the right by unity in 
the form of the variable itself (G/G, R/R and E/E); and third, multiply the parameter f by I/I, the 
parameter h by X/X and the parameter b by N/N. 
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changes in the behavioural parameters of the economy, and exogenous effects, where the 
word ‘exogenous’ does not refer to the domestic-international dichotomy, but to within 
and without the parameter structure of the economy. 
 Taking these in reverse order, exogenous effects have a major impact on the 
growth rates of sub-Saharan economies, with the most important being the growth rates 
of the developed countries (and, increasingly, China), prices of primary products (related 
to the previous), weather conditions, and capital flows (including development 
assistance).  The importance of such influences is indirectly indicated by the rather low 
explanatory power of cross-country regressions for African countries whose principle 
arguments are domestic variables (for a review of several studies see Ndulu 2007).  If one 
takes growth residuals as an indicator of exogenous effects, they may account for up to 
half of annual variations.  A strong factor in improved growth performance of the 
countries covered in this study was the increase in primary product prices in the 2000s, 
both for agricultural and mineral commodities.  For the countries that are 
overwhelmingly agricultural, weather conditions were key, though no one has produced a 
rigorous method of estimating the impact by country.  Some exogenous effects have a 
similar impact across countries and, therefore, would tend ceterius paribus to make 
growth rates converge.   
 However, differences in behavioural relationships mean that changes in 
exogenous variables, such as international prices and weather, are transmitted to each 
country to a different degree.  An obvious example is the level of development of capital 
markets.  In South Africa turbulence in international money markets have a direct and 
rapid impact on the national economy;  in countries with underdeveloped capital markets 
the impact would be indirect and weak in the short term.  Perhaps the most important of 
behavioural relationships for growth are the elasticity of export production with respect to 
international prices and exchange rates, and the elasticity of investment with respect to 
capital cost, including interest rates.  Even without rigorously-generated evidence on 
these elasticities, of which there is little, one can conclude that export elasticities would 
tend to be low in the short term for agricultural products (see Weeks et. al. 2007).  
Therefore, it is reasonable to presume that X,E in the equation above would vary 
substantially across the thirteen countries.  The import elasticity, N,E, would be 
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determined primarily by the extent to which there are domestic substitutes.  As a result of 
trade liberalisation policies in all of the thirteen countries domestic production of 
manufactures declined in the 1990s, with limited recovery in the 2000s.  As a result the 
import elasticities with respect to the exchange rate would tend to be similar, quite low, 
across countries, except for South Africa and perhaps Kenya. 
 One can also be confident that the elasticity of investment with respect to interest 
rates would be low in all countries except South Africa.  This is because of the 
underdevelopment of capital markets, the structure of commercial bank assets,2 and the 
tendency of international companies to finance investment from abroad where interest 
rates would be lower almost without exception.  Similarly, the interest rate in most of the 
thirteen countries plays only a weak role in attracting capital flows, due to a lack of 
financial intermediation.  Again, South Africa could be the exception. 
 With regard to policy instruments, there is some potential for these to be used to 
generate similar growth rates across countries.  It is unfortunate that official similarities 
in fiscal policy, an emphasis on low deficits, would result in convergence toward rates 
below the growth potential of the countries.  This issue is considered in the next section.  
Policy convergence on the role of the central bank rate has also had a growth depressing 
effect, though the mechanism is complicated.  While national money markets are not the 
primary source of investment by international companies, they are important for domestic 
enterprises.  The extensive use of the central bank rate for inflation control in the region 
tended to distort rates above their market determined level in the 1990s and 2000s, which 
we demonstrate below.  This discourages investment by domestic enterprises, as well as 
to raise the fiscal cost of the domestic debt. 
 We have to this point assumed that the three policy instruments in equation 1 can 
be treated as independent, which is not the case.  A change in the exchange rate, either 
through some market process or being set by the central bank, has a direct impact on the 
domestic price level.  For example, a nominal devaluation of ten percent in an economy 
with an import share of forty percent of GDP, the average for the thirteen countries in the 
2000s, will tend to raise the domestic price level by four percent.  This increase in the 
                                                 
2 Commercial banks in all the thirteen countries except South Africa hold a large part of their 
income generating assets in government bonds.  See Weeks, et. al. (2006). 
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price level, in addition to reducing the real devaluation, will have a contractionary effect 
through a lower the real money supply.  It would also tend to reduce the real purchasing 
power of government expenditure, though this would be partly offset by the increase in 
the domestic currency value of foreign currency revenues of the government, from trade 
taxes, development assistance, and non-concessionary borrowing in international money 
markets. 
 The price level effect of devaluation leads the analysis into consideration of the 
effectiveness of monetary supply management as an instrument of policy.  Differences 
among countries imply that similar monetary policies would not necessarily result in 
outcome convergence.  This can be demonstrated by placing the discussion in the context 
of the current macro orthodoxy that favours flexible or ‘floating’ exchange rates.  The 
standard textbook analysis concludes that with a flexible exchange rate, money policy, 
specifically central bank adjustments of the money supply, is effective in managing the 
level of output and fiscal policy is not.  This, the well-known conclusion of the Mundell-
Fleming model, is used to justify an active monetary policy and passive fiscal exchange 
rate policies. 
 However, this conclusion assumes that changes in the exchange rate have no 
impact on the domestic price level, which is contrary to theory and reality.  If we define 
the symbol y,m as the elasticity of output (GDP) with respect to changes in the money 
supply, algebraic manipulation of the balance of payments identity shows it to be the 
following:3 
 1. Perfectly elastic capital flows 
(2) y,m = T[1 - a3]/[a3 +T] 
 2. Imperfectly elastic capital flows: 
(3) y,m = T*[(1 - a3)/(a3 +T*)][Rw/Rd] 
 Where 
                                                 
3 The algebra is demonstrated in detail in Weeks 2008.  It involves algebraic manipulations such 
as those described for equation 1. 
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  T = sum of the elasticities of exports and imports with respect to the real 
exchange rate (with the Marshall Lerner condition requiring it be greater than 
zero);4 
 T* =  sum of the elasticities of exports and imports with respect to the real 
exchange rate when exports and imports are not equal; 
 a3 = import share, N/Y; 
 Rw  = the ‘world rate of interest (e.g., London inter-bank rate); and 
 Rd  = domestic rate of interest.  
 
 In the case of perfectly elastic capital flows there can be no difference between 
the international and domestic rate of interest and the domestic rate.  While this case is 
hardly relevant for the countries under review, it is analytically useful because it yields 
the highest possible value for the effectiveness of monetary policy.  Assume a sum of 
trade elasticities of unity, extremely high for the short run (because Rw = Rd).  For the 
value import share across the 13 countries of 42.7 percent, the implied effectiveness of 
monetary policy in managing the level of output is forty percent.  For the nine low 
income countries with their lower import share of one-third, effectiveness is fifty percent.  
Were the sum of the trade elasticities a more realistic .5, the effectiveness would fall to 
eight percent and twenty percent, respectively.  If Rw>Rw, as is the case for all thirteen 
countries, the effectiveness of monetary policy is even less, approaching zero.  These 
calculations imply that for countries with high import shares and low trade elasticities, 
fiscal policy is more effective than monetary policy when the exchange rate regime is 
flexible.5 
 It follows from this discussion is that if a government chooses to rely on an active 
monetary policy with fiscal and exchange rate policies passive, its ability to manage the 
economy would be extremely limited.  In consequence, any outcome convergence or 
divergence would be the result of non-policy influence.  On the basis of the discussion in 
this section, several conclusions can be drawn: 
                                                 
4 In the more familiar case of the nominal exchange rate the condition is that T be equal to or 
greater than unity.  
5 The effectiveness of fiscal policy is y,m – 1 (Weeks 2008). 
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1. There is a substantial non-policy element in the determination of all 
macroeconomic variables in the countries covered by this study, with GDP 
growth being but an example. 
2.  Relying on an active monetary policy ensures that governments have little 
control over macro outcomes. 
3.  Within an orthodox macro framework, policy convergence in the sense of 
similar practice of use of policy instruments across countries will not necessarily 
foster outcome convergence. 
 With these points made, the study turns to empirical trends in macro variables 
during 1980-2007.  These trends indicate the extent to which further regional integration 
might be feasible, and, more important for the medium term, whether the improved 
growth performances across countries during the 2000s might be sustained. 
 
III.  Empirical Trends 
 III.1  Introduction 
 
 Macroeconomic stability is one of the goals of fiscal and monetary policy.  The 
term is sometimes used without a clear indication of its operational meaning, and its 
relationship to poverty reduction rarely specified rigorously.  For policy purposes, the 
term almost always refers to lowering inflation and maintaining a sustainable balance of 
payments.   The exact level of inflation and condition of the balance of payments that 
constitutes ‘stability’ should be established in the context of each country.  Stability is but 
one of several goals of macroeconomic policy.  Its practice derives from the 
government’s management of inflation and the balance of payments.  In the orthodox 
macro framework macroeconomic stability is a necessary and prior condition for all other 
policy goals.  Whether this is a rational policy approach depends upon the operating 
definition of macroeconomic stability, and in all countries is an empirical issue.  As 
Dornbusch (1991) famously stated, stability is not a ticket to prosperity.  
 An economy is unstable at the macroeconomic (aggregate) level if key economic 
aggregates fluctuate excessively over time. To be operational, this definition requires the 
identification of the aggregates that signal the need for a policy response, and a definition 
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of excessive fluctuations, because market economies are dynamic and in continual flux to 
some degree.   Fluctuations can be judged as excessive on the basis of two general rules:  
1) when they immediately undermine the achievement of outcomes that are policy goals 
of the government;  or 2) inherent in them is the tendency to increase in amplitude which 
will undermine those outcomes at some future time.  Fluctuations in variables that have 
no impact on desired outcomes, even if they are extreme by some reasonable judgement, 
are of no policy importance.  The key variables to monitor to maintain macroeconomic 
stability are domestic inflation, the exchange rate, investment (public and private), 
current government expenditure on economic and social services, and exports, since they 
each affect both growth and distribution, and growth on both the demand and supply 
sides.     
 In as far as macro instability impacts on growth and poverty reduction, its 
specification in terms of the rate of inflation will vary across the thirteen countries under 
review.  As is argued below, there is no theoretical or empirical support for a policy to 
target the same inflation rate in each country.  Instead, policy makers can make 
macroeconomic stability derivative from growth and poverty goals rather than the 
reverse.  Another way to put this is if stabilisation is defined with respect to the inflation 
result, there are desirable and undesirable stabilisation outcomes.  Low inflation 
associated with low growth may be defined as a stabilised economy by some, but it is an 
unacceptable outcome that requires policy intervention to correct.     
 
III.2  Growth and Poverty 
 The primary goal of government should be to foster rapid, sustained economic 
growth which achieves the maximum feasible rate of poverty reduction.   The qualifier 
‘maximum feasible’ is important because economic growth will tend to reduce poverty to 
some extent in all but exception cases.  However, economic growth without a pro-poor 
focus can have a limited impact on poverty for several reasons.   
 First, the aggregate elasticity of poverty reduction with respect to output growth 
may be very low, requiring an unachievable growth rate to reach a policy objective such 
as the Millennium Development Goal of reducing poverty by half by 2015.  The elasticity 
may be low because the population under the poverty line is concentrated towards the 
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bottom of the income distribution, or because the gains from economic growth are 
concentrated toward the upper end of the income scale.  Second, with no change in the 
distribution of income, the poverty reducing effect of growth may be temporary, reversed 
when growth turns negative.  And third, the growth pattern can simultaneously reduce 
and increase poverty, with the net effect indeterminate ex ante.  This may result if growth 
results in changes in assets or technology than create landlessness and unemployment. 
 With these general points in mind, we turn to Table 1, which reports growth rates 
for the thirteen countries of East, Central and Southern Africa, with a graphical 
presentation in Figures 1 and 2.  The statistics show a notable difference between the 
middle income countries (Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa and Swaziland) and the low 
income countries (Burundi, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe).6  For aggregate GDP, the growth of the former group was 
substantially higher in the 1980s than in either of the subsequent decades, with little 
difference between the 1990s and 2000s.  For the low income countries the reverse was 
the case, considerably more rapid growth in the 2000s.  In all but six years during 1980-
2007 per capita income grew faster in the middle income countries, suggesting no 
tendency for levels to converge over time.  The decline in the rate of population growth 
partly contributed to the increase in per capita income growth, more for the middle 
income countries than for the low income countries.  Despite the increase in economic 
growth, five low income countries had lower per capita incomes for the 2000s than for 
the 1980s, as shown in Table 2 (Zimbabwe, Kenya, Rwanda, Malawi and Burundi). 
 Not withstanding the higher growth rates during the 2000s, if they can be 
sustained, optimism must be tempered by the magnitude of the task of poverty reduction, 
which is demonstrated in Tables 3a and 3b.   Table 3a reports poverty and income 
distribution statistics for the countries from two sources, the World Bank and the OECD.  
For several countries there are substantial differences in the statistics, which are unlikely 
to be explained by difference survey years.  Malawi is perhaps the clearest example.  The 
World Bank reports for 1997 an overall one US dollar a day poverty rate of 42 percent 
                                                 
6 For the two categories we follow the IMF (for example, IMF 2008h).  The IMF sources provide 
no explanation for the apparent anomaly of Lesotho being in the middle income group, despite a 
per capita income in 2006 of only US$ 528 (2000 prices).  The anomaly appears all the greater 
because in 1980 Zimbabwe’s per capita income was double that of Lesotho’s. 
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and a Gini coefficient of 50, while the OECD statistics for 2004 are 21 percent and 39.  It 
is extremely unlikely that the two pairs of statistics can be reconciled.  For the statistical 
exercise in Table 3a the figures reported by the OECD are used. 
 It comes as no surprise that the poverty shares are considerably higher for the low 
income countries, with their difference from the middle income countries statistically 
significant using a difference of means test.  Perhaps less expected is the high degree of 
income inequality in the sub-region.  All the middle income countries had Gini 
coefficients above 50 in the OECD statistics, which is comparable to inequality in Latin 
America.  For the nine low income countries, seven were above 40, and three were fifty 
or more.  These are extremely high levels of inequality, all the more so because the 
distribution measure is based on consumption data, which invariably shows lower 
inequality than income data.  The inequality statistics indicate clearly a potential for 
including distributional policies within growth strategies. 
 If governments seek a substantial reduction in poverty in the medium term, 
distributional policies would be necessary.  This is demonstrated in Table 3b by 
calculating growth rates that would be necessary to meet the first Millennium 
Development Goal of reducing extreme poverty by half in 2015 (with 1990 as the base 
year).  For reference points, the table gives per capita income in 1990 and 2006, and the 
five year average rate of growth for 2002-2007.  The fourth column reports the calculated 
rate of growth required during 2007-2015 to make poverty in 2015 fall to half its level of 
1990 on the assumption of an unchanged distribution.7  For only three of thirteen 
countries is the growth rate required for the poverty target below or equal to the average 
for 2002-2007 (the ‘growth gap’).  It is probable that for eight of the countries, including 
two middle income countries, the required growth rate of per capita income is not 
feasible, because of growth gaps in excess of three percentage points.  Consider for 
example South Africa:  reaching the target poverty level would require eight years of 
sustained growth in aggregate GDP in excess of eight percent.  Even Tanzania’s 
                                                 
7 The growth rate is calculated using the technique in Dagdeviren, van der Hoeven and Weeks 
(2002).  The US one dollar a day head count poverty share represents one point in the income 
distribution.  A Pareto function is constructed that passes through this point and yields a 
distributional coefficient that is the analogue of the country’s Gini coefficient.  This presents the 
initial distribution.  For the 2015 distribution the poverty target provides the required point on the 
Pareto curve.  The growth rate appropriate to the target poverty level can then be calculated. 
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probability of success could be considered low, with sustained growth of seven percent 
per annum required.8 
 The statistics suggest that while growth rates improved for the low income 
countries of the region in the 2000s, except for a few countries this improvement was 
well below what would be necessary to achieve the poverty reduction judged necessary 
by international consensus (see ECA 2008, 1).  In countries experiencing an increase in 
inequality, the required growth rate would be above the estimate in Table 3b.  It follows 
that either distributional policies must guide growth strategies, or the Millennium poverty 
target will not be met. 
  
III.3  External Sector 
 The current orthodoxy that exchange rates should be determined in an unregulated 
foreign exchange market, that they should ‘float’, is a marked reversal of the previous 
orthodoxy of twenty-five years.  During 1945-1971, all members of the IMF were 
signatories to an agreement that governments would maintain a fixed rate, usually to the 
US dollar, and inform the IMF of intentions to devalue or revalue.9  The system of fixed 
exchange rates broke down not because of a change in judgement about its effectiveness; 
on the contrary, attempts were made to extend its life when its imminent demise was 
obvious.  Given the strength of the fixed exchange rate orthodoxy before the early 1970s, 
it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the acceptance of the theoretical arguments for 
‘flexible’ rates represented making a virtue of necessity, though exhibiting questionable 
virtue for the countries under review. 
The orthodox arguments for fiscal austerity and tight monetary policy allege that 
these indirectly benefit the poor, by fostering macroeconomic stability.  In as far as this 
might be true, one would conclude that the poor would benefit no more than the 
population as a whole, so strictly speaking these policies would not be pro-poor.  In the 
case of flexible exchange rates, the orthodox argument is that they benefit the poor 
directly, and more than the non-poor.  The argument, which is made for underdeveloped 
                                                 
8 These estimates are similar to those made by the ECA in ECA (1999, 22ff). 
9 In practice prior notice was given only by error because of the currency speculation which 
would result. 
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countries in general and especially the sub-Saharan region, goes as follows:  1) the 
majority of poor households are rural, deriving their livelihoods directly or indirectly 
from agriculture; 2) agricultural commodities are tradables; 3) real currency depreciation 
raises the prices of tradables relatively to non-tradables; and 4) flexible exchange rates 
result in real currency depreciation.10 
For our thirteen countries only the first step in the argument are generally valid.  
In only a few of the countries is a majority of the population urban, and in none is a 
majority of the poor.  However, the second, third and fourth steps in the analytical 
sequence are of dubious validity.  Tradability is not determined simply, by international 
markets for similar products.  As Liang (1992) argued, a commodity is a tradable only if 
it is a close substitute in the international market, and if transport costs are not 
prohibitive.  Many of the major products of small farmers in the sub-region are not close 
substitutes to international products, and the producers are so distant from transport and 
marketing channels that even close substitutes may not in practice be traded 
internationally.  
While in theory a real devaluation should increase the price of tradables, if 
domestic markets are inefficient, the relative price change can be slight.  Even more 
important, in many sub-Saharan countries a large portion of the poor, both urban and 
rural, may be net food buyers, in the latter case because they are agricultural day 
labourers.  The net impact of a rise in the relative price of tradables on poverty cannot be 
determined a priori.  None-the-less, the export promotion effect of a real devaluation 
would be a key part of a pro-poor exchange rate policy.  Before the mid-2000s one could 
safely assume that a floating exchange rate regime in the sub-region would result in 
nominal devaluation.  However, the increase in primary product prices, especially of 
minerals, generated nominal appreciations, most notably in Botswana and Zambia.  Prior 
to the mid-2000s, it might have been realistic to assume that shifting from a fixed to a 
flexible exchange rate would result in devaluation, but not once primary products began 
to rise.  It was in part for this reason that the government of Botswana adopted a 
‘crawling peg’ regime. 
                                                 
10 It would be more precise to say that orthodox theory concludes that a floating regime would 
produce a nominal exchange rate that continually adjusted to the optimum for the relative price of 
tradables and non-tradables.   
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Whatever the distributional effects of a floating exchange rate regime, within the 
orthodox framework its general purpose would be to enforce the efficient allocation of 
resources between traded and non-traded commodities via market forces.   The specific 
outcome anticipated by ‘freeing’ the exchange rate combined with trade liberalisation 
would be the rise in the share of export production, and a tendency for the balance of 
payments to adjust to a sustainable position.  Table 4 reports the exports shares for the 
countries of the region by decades.  At the risk over oversimplification, the 1980s can be 
treated as a decade of administrative controls over trade and moderate to high tariffs, the 
1990s as a decade of rapid transition to trade liberalisation, and the 2000s as a decade of 
liberalised trade (see ECA 2004 and Geda 2001). 
Inspection of Figure 3 suggests that shifts in trade policy across the region 
coincided with a sudden increase in the rate of growth of exports at the end of the 1990s 
for both the middle and low income countries.  However, for both groups the moment of 
rapid export growth was brief.  During 2000-2006, the average growth of exports 
volumes was seven percent per annum for the middle income countries and eleven for the 
low income countries.  For 2002-2006, the averages fell to four and six percent, 
respectively (excluding Zimbabwe from the latter group for both periods).  Inspection of 
standard deviations indicates no tendency for export growth rates to converge. 
Given likely margins of measurement error, it appears that no change occurred in 
export orientation for either middle income or low income countries from the 1980s to 
the 1990s (see Table 4 and Figure 4).  For the former group export shares fell in two 
countries and rose in two.  For the nine low income countries, there was no statistically 
significant change for five countries, a fall for one (Rwanda), increase for two 
(Mozambique and Zimbabwe), and no data for Tanzania during the 1980s.  For the 
2000s, when one would expect a shift towards tradables to manifest itself, it appears from 
the averages that there was a substantial increase of the middle income countries and a 
moderate increase for the low income countries.  Looking across countries, the increase 
for the middle income countries was substantial in three countries, with the exception 
being Botswana.  However, for the low income countries, close inspection produces the 
conclusion that no significant increase occurred.  Mozambique’s increase from about 
thirteen percent in the 1990s to over thirty percent in the 2000s accounts for almost all the 
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rise in the low income average (see note to Table 4).  The export share fell in Kenya and 
Zimbabwe, showed no significant change for Burundi, Tanzania and Zambia, and rose in 
Rwanda and Uganda.  For the last two countries the average for the 2000s was close 
those for the 1980s. 
Import shares rose slightly for the low income countries from the 1990s to the 
2000s, while falling substantially for the middle income countries (see Table 5 and Figure 
5).  The combination of the movements in export and import shares had quite different 
consequences for the middle income and low in groups (Table 6 and figure 6).  For the 
former, the trade position in the 2000s was sustainable, while it is clear that it was not for 
the low income group.  Botswana enjoyed a remarkable trade surplus of fourteen percent 
of GDP, and South Africa’s trade was approximately balanced.  Swaziland ran trade 
deficits in the 2000s, but substantially lower than previous decades and covered by 
sustained remittances from labourers in South Africa.  The only middle income country 
with a trade deficit likely to be unsustainable was the dubiously categorised Lesotho, 
which on per capita income criterion should be low income.  The situation for the low 
income group was dramatically different, with trade deficits in every country.  Running 
sustainable trade deficits is rational trade policy for low income countries because of their 
typical lack of a domestic capital goods sector.  However, ‘sustainable’ is a key modifier, 
and it would appear that the deficits were not sustainable in several of the countries:  
Burundi, Malawi, Rwanda and Uganda, and perhaps Tanzania.11  Each of these countries 
had average deficits in excess of ten percent of GDP, and none would be likely to enjoy 
sustained private capital flows or remittances approaching the size of their deficits. 
As a consequence of their large trade deficits, the low income countries were 
notably dependent on development assistance, as much so in the 2000s as during the 
1990s.  Table 7 shows the current account balances of the thirteen countries, with and 
without development assistance (also Figure 7).  When ODA grants are included, the 
middle income current account in GDP was close to zero in all decades, and at 
sustainable levels in the 2000s except for Lesotho.  Again except for Lesotho the current 
                                                 
11 As a result of the dramatic increase in the price of copper, Zambia’s trade deficit declined from 
thirteen percent of GDP in 2004 to three percent in 2005, then moved into surplus in 2006 and 
2007.  As discussed below, this resulted in a massive appreciation of the Kwacha (Weeks, et. al. 
2007) 
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account balances without ODA during the 2000s were either in surplus (Botswana) or 
showed quite small deficits (South Africa and Swaziland).   In contrast, for the low 
income countries the current account deficits without ODA were quite extraordinary:  
seventeen percent of GDP in the 1980s, rising to over thirty percent in the 1990s, and a 
decline to twenty-five percent in the 2000s.12  If the astounding deficit for Mozambique 
were excluded from the average for the 1990s, the difference between the 1990s and 
2000s would not be statistically significant. 
The conclusion cannot be avoided that for the low income countries of the sub-
region it is probable that the current accounts were less sustainable in the 2000s than 
twenty years before, with no significant improvement compared to the 1990s.  This 
conclusion implies another:  of highest priority for the low income countries of the sub-
region is to narrow their trade gaps.  The sub-region is excessively dependent on 
development assistance, which is both unreliable in delivery and distorting for policy 
making (UNCTAD 2000 and Geda and Weeks 2008). 
 As a general policy rule, governments should maintain a level of reserves 
sufficient to cover expected and unexpected declines in foreign exchange inflows.  This is 
particularly important for agricultural exporters because of the seasonal character of those 
flows.  However, for a developing country it is not rational to hold reserves in excess of 
precautionary requirements.  These idle reserves represent a foregone opportunity for 
development expenditure for countries in which most capital goods are imported.13  
Inspection of Table 8 shows an excessive accumulation of reserves for several countries 
(see also Figure 8).  During the 1990s and 2000s, Botswana held reserves in excess of 
two and one half years of imports, far greater than the most risk-averse strategy would 
dictate as rational.  Among the low-income countries in the 2000s, Rwanda, Tanzania and 
Uganda maintained reserves in excess of six months of imports.  In addition to carrying a 
substantial opportunity cost, the high level of reserves would be a source of upward 
pressure on the nominal exchange rate, which would undermine export growth.  While 
the excessive reserves might be corrected by appreciation, this would be brought about by 
                                                 
12 The lump sum debt relief payments during 2005-2007 are excluded from the current account. 
13 The author wishes to thank Masood Karshenas for point this out. 
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a decline in export competitiveness that could have serious medium and long term effects 
(see Weeks, et. al. 2007).  
Figure 9, showing nominal exchange rates deflated by the GDP price index, 
confirms a tendency to appreciation among the countries, especially for the middle 
income group after 2002.  Every middle income country showed a substantial real 
appreciation between 200 and 2007, with Botswana’s twenty-five percent the lowest of 
the four.  Among the low income countries, four had appreciations in excess of thirty 
percent (Kenya, Malawi, Uganda and Zambia), and only two experienced depreciations, 
small in both cases (1.4 percent for Mozambique and 3.2 for Tanzania).  If export 
competitiveness was the goals of governments, their exchange rate policies did not 
achieve it. 
 
III.4  Investment 
 In the long term, one of the constraints on the rate of growth of an economy is the 
rate of investment.  While the rate of investment does not determine the rate of growth, 
by its increments to the capital stock it sets the sustainable upper limit, around which the 
actual rate of growth will fluctuate as capacity utilisation rises above and falls below its 
economically optimal level.  Countries can grow rapidly without an increase in the rate of 
investment as idle capacity is reduced, but this is a short and medium term phenomenon 
that cannot be sustained. 
 A sustained increase in the rate of growth of the countries in the sub-region 
requires a sustained increase in the share of investment in GDP.  In addition to creating 
capacity, investment can be used as a mechanism for making growth more poverty 
reducing.  This would be the case if, for example, infrastructure investments were 
directed to parts of the country where poverty rates were relatively high.  The use of 
investment to make growth more poverty reducing highlights the importance of the 
public sector component.  Private investment can be pro-poor in the strict sense of raising 
the incomes of the poor more than those of the non-poor, but it is unreasonable to expect 
profit seeking enterprises to design their investments with this purpose.  The public 
sector, by contrast, can base its investment criteria on social rates of return that included 
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considerations of greater equality of distribution and more rapid poverty reduction 
(Weeks and Roy 2004).  
 Given the importance of investment for more rapid, sustainable growth that is 
poverty reducing, the trends in the sub-region are not encouraging.  Table 9 shows that on 
average for all countries of the sub-region, the rate of investment was lower in the 2000s 
than in the 1990s, and not statistically different from the average of the 1980s.  There was 
a notable difference between the middle and low income countries.  Despite the stronger 
fiscal position of the middle-income countries (see next sub-section), overall investment 
was substantially lower in the 2000s than for the previous decades, declining for all four 
countries.  The low income countries show an increase in each decade when Zimbabwe is 
excluded, with a weak tendency toward converging on the average among the countries.  
However, the low income average remained low in the 2000s.  On the basis of 
empirically realistic capital output ratios the average investment share in the 2000s, 18.6 
percent, would imply a sustainable potential growth rate of only four to five percent, well 
below the rate that would achieve the MDG poverty target by 2015. 
 The statistics on investment indicate that raising the rate of capital formation must 
be a priority throughout the region.  Except for Lesotho none of the countries have 
investment shares that approach those of the East and Southeast Asian countries in their 
rapid growth period of the last few decades of the twentieth century, or of the Latin 
American countries before the debt crisis (see Weeks 2000).  While investment rates have 
converged in the region, the convergence has been towards a level implying a low 
sustainable growth rate.  Use of part of the accumulated foreign reserves would be part of 
increasing public investment. 
 
III.5  Public Sector 
 The most important policy limit on a pro-poor macro policy is the expenditure 
constraint.  To consider this, we use Walter Heller’s definition of ‘fiscal space’, as the 
potential for expenditure expansion consistent with macro stability.  The creation of fiscal 
space is the essence of a pro-poor framework, and all other macro policies derive from it.  
There are four ways to generate fiscal space:  raising the revenue share in GDP; 
 19
increasing the fiscal deficit; benefiting from debt relief; and receiving a higher level of 
development assistance.  
Increasing the share of public revenue in GDP is the most effective way to create 
fiscal space, especially when combined with a prudent deficit.  Increasing revenue has the 
potential to be pro-poor both on the revenue and expenditure sides, the former through 
progressive taxation and the latter through social programmes and public investment.  
Raising tax rates and extending coverage are the obvious methods for increasing revenue.  
The scope to do both varies in the countries under review.  One of the most important 
determinants of revenue generation is the level of development of a country.  Middle 
income countries have considerably more capacity to generate public revenue than low 
income countries, because of the larger share of the so-called formal sector.  Six of the 
countries of the sub-region have major exports generated by international companies, 
which in itself increases the potential for revenue collection.14   
It would be much more difficult to raise revenue in the countries that are almost 
exclusively agricultural exporters.  The potential for broadening the coverage of sales 
taxes is limited in these countries, because a large portion of sales in rural and urban 
areas are by small and micro operators.  Assessing the level of turnover of these operators 
involves the same problems as estimating incomes.  It is not surprising that since 
independence much of public revenue in the sub-Saharan region came from taxes on 
external trade, which as a result of trade liberalization has declined.  The attempt to 
replace these by so-called value added taxes has not in general proved successful, in the 
sub-Saharan countries or elsewhere (Weeks & Roy 2004).  The collection of VAT suffers 
from the same problems as for sales taxes in general.   
The difficulties of raising public revenue in countries low-income that do not have 
mineral resources is shown in Table 10 and Figure 10.  The share of public revenue in the 
four middle income countries was almost forty percent of GDP in the mid-2000s, with 
Lesotho the having the highest share of over fifty percent, and South Africa the lowest at 
about a quarter of GDP.  Well over half of Lesotho’s revenue derived from customs 
levies, the highest share in the region, and income taxes accounted for the next largest 
                                                 
14 These are Botswana (diamonds), Kenya (market vegetables and tourism), Mozambique 
(electric power), South Africa (precious stones, gold and other minerals), Zambia (copper), and 
Zimbabwe (precious and non-precious metals). 
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category (IMF 2008c).  To a great extent, this strong revenue performance was the result 
of the customs treaty with South Africa and remittances, arrangements not open to other 
countries in the region except for Botswana and Swaziland, both of which had revenue 
shares well thirty percent of GDP (enhanced by mineral wealth in the case of Botswana).  
The relatively low revenue share of South Africa can be interpreted as a policy choice 
rather than capacity to raise revenue.  The effect of mineral wealth is shown in the case of 
Zimbabwe, which had revenue shares in all decades well above what one would expect 
for a low income country. 
At the low end of the scale were Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda, all low-income 
countries without mineral wealth, with revenue shares of 12-13 percent of GDP.  Two 
notable cases were Mozambique and Zambia, which had low revenue shares, but by the 
mid-2000s had great potential to raise revenue, Mozambique from energy exports to 
South Africa and Zambia from a dramatic rise in the copper price.15   Raising revenue in 
these two countries could be achieved through higher taxes on exporters, though Zambia 
was constrained in taxing copper production by the extremely unfavourable privatisation 
contracts during the 1990s (Weeks, et. al., 2006). 
The seriousness of the revenue problem in the sub-region is shown in Table11, 
which reports fiscal balances as a proportion of GDP with and without development 
assistance (see Figures 11 and 12).  During the period for which there were comparable 
statistics, 1992-2007, the middle income countries eliminated deficits without or without 
development assistance.  For the low income countries the result was quite different.  
With the inclusion of development assistance, it appears that fiscal balances improved 
substantially, from an average deficit of four percent of GDP in the first half of the 2000s 
to well under two percent in the middle of the decade.  The improvement was entirely the 
result of development assistance.  Net of development assistance, the low income 
countries had an average deficits-GDP ratio in the mid-200s that was not significantly 
different from the 1990s.  This is only partly explained by the extraordinary increase in 
the deficit of Burundi from the early to the middle 2000s.  Deficits increased substantially 
                                                 
15 Electricity from the Cahora Bassa dam in Mozambique was exported to South Africa.  Gas 
fields in Pande and Temane also exported to South Africa.  See 
 http://www.dfid.gov.uk/countries/africa/Mozambique/Energy.pdf 
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in both Rwanda and Tanzania;  in the latter case, the fiscal deficit in the second half  of 
the 2000s was higher than in previous periods. 
In the low income countries of the sub-region revenue generation remained as 
weak in the 2000s as it had been in the previous decade.  Because of the difference 
structures of the economies of the sub-region no convergence to a common revenue share 
occurred, and one could not expect this.  An urgent priority for the low income countries 
of the sub-region is to increase revenue to reduce dependence on development assistance.  
The middle income countries of the sub-region have a more enviable priority:  to use 




III.5  Monetary Sector 
 Throughout the sub-region central banks have applied or are in the transition to 
applying a monetary regime dominated by ‘inflation targeting’.  The analytical basis of 
this policy is the presumption that every economy is in or moving toward general 
equilibrium and inflation is the result of expectations of inflation and ‘random shocks’.  
In other words, inflation has no structural cause;  it follows from people’s anticipation of 
it, and these anticipations are primarily the result of government behaviour.  In its most 
inflexible form, inflation targeting assigns to the central bank the mandate to use its 
policy instruments to realize an inflation rate within a specific range, or, more extreme, 
below a specific rate (see Saad Filho 2005).  The instrument used to ‘hit’ the target is 
almost always the nominal interest rate.  In practice, attempting to fulfil such a mandate 
over-rides all other policy objectives, be they short, medium or long run, including the 
maintenance of a competitive exchange rate, stimulating investment, and managing the 
budgetary cost of the government’s debt. 
The major argument in favour of inflation targeting is that its success, a low 
inflation rate with a small variation, would foster growth by providing a ‘stable macro 
environment’.  There are two issues here: the effect and wisdom of targeting; and the 
inflation rate to be targeted.  The alleged positive benefits of inflation targeting require a 
prior acceptance that the policy is feasible;  i.e., that most central banks in the sub-region 
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could by use of the monetary instruments available to them realize a pre-determined rate 
of inflation and maintain it with small variability.   
This proposition is not credible, because of the large and unavoidable stochastic 
(random ‘shock’) element in policy outcomes.  For example, during 1980-1999, the 
average annual terms of trade shock across the thirteen countries equalled 4.5 percent of 
GDP, with a standard deviation of 5.4.16  For the average sub-regional economy with a 
trade sector of about one-third to one-fourth of GDP (average of the export and import 
shares), this would imply an annual average price ‘shock’ of 1.5 to two percent.  Because 
the standard deviation is so large, there would be a thirty-three percent probability of a 
positive shock of three percent in any year.  An inflation target of five percent, for 
example, would be exceeded half the time (by the definition of randomness), and be 
double the target rate ten percent of the time.  Should the mandate demand five percent or 
less in most years, the de facto target would have to be well below the mandated target.  
This implies an institutionalization of high nominal interest rates, which would translate 
into demand-compressing real interest rates. 
In the context of such large and persistent terms of trade shocks, not to mention 
weather-related shocks, it would be impossible for the central bank to achieve the basic 
goal of a stable and predictable rate of inflation.   But, could it be argued that inflation 
has been so serious in the sub-Saharan countries that targeting it is required to bring the 
rate down, even if stability is beyond policy?  Table 12 presents statistics to evaluate this 
question.  Over three decades inflation rates have fallen, both for the middle and the low-
income countries.  Leaving out the hyper-inflation case of Zimbabwe, in the 1980s, ten of 
the remaining twelve countries had double-digit inflation.  In the first half of the 1990s 
this increased to eleven, all but Burundi.  During 1995-99 the number fell to seven, to 
four during 2000-04, and to three for 2005-07.  As the inflation rates for the low-income 
countries declined into the range of five to ten percent, there was a ‘low-inflation’ group 
and a ‘high-inflation’ group.  For the members of the former, Burundi, Kenya, Malawi 
and Rwanda, the 1990s was a strongly inflationary decade, with both the 1980s and the 
2000s characterised by rate around ten percent.  Their average for the 2000s was almost 
                                                 
16 The calculation is from World Development Indicators 2008, ‘Terms of Trade Adjustment’, 
and the average is of the absolute value. 
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the same as for the 1980s.  Whatever policy adjustments occurred had little impact on the 
rate of inflation. 
By contrast, the four low-income countries in the high-inflation group, 
Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, showed dramatic falls in inflation from the 
second half of the 1990s onwards, from an average of over fifty percent to converge on 
the low-inflation group.  This pattern, no change for the low-inflation group in the 2000s 
compared to the 1980s, and dramatic decline for the high-inflation countries, strongly 
suggests that the fall in inflationary pressures was not the result of short term monetary 
policies.  Had orthodox stabilisation programmes been the cause of the abatement of 
inflation, one would have expected this to manifest itself during the 1990s, when both 
groups of countries suffered form rapid price increases.  A more convincing explanation 
lies in the characteristics of the high-inflation countries.  All four were countries 
undergoing fundamental structural transitions during the 1980s and 1990s:  from 
economic controls to market regulation in the cases of Tanzania and Zambia;  and from 
controls to market regulation severely aggravated by the transition from conflict to 
reconstruction for Mozambique and Uganda.  Burundi and Rwanda also suffered from 
terrible conflicts, but not fundamental change of economic regime.  This non-rigorous 
review suggests that the rapid liberalisation of controlled economies is an inherently 
inflationary process.  Whether or not this interpretation is correct, it is clear that a 
convergence has occurred in the sub-region to relatively low inflation. 
 As discussed at the beginning of this section, the orthodox prescription for 
inflation control is use of the central bank rate.  Table 13 and Figure 13, reporting price-
deflated interest rates show the consequences.  In the 1980s, three countries had negative 
real interest rates, Botswana (very slightly negative), Uganda and Zambia, three were 
positive and below five percent, four above five, and none above ten.  In the 1990s one 
country had a negative average rate (Zambia at -1.4), five were positive and below five, 
and six above five, three of which were above ten.  During 2000-2007 there was again 
one negative rate (Zimbabwe), one positive rate below five percent, and eleven above 
five of which no less than six above ten percent.  If one excludes the crisis case of 
Zimbabwe, in the 2000s half of the twelve countries of the region had real interest rates 
above ten percent;  the low-income average was eleven percent. 
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 Economic theory tells one that just as excessive wages represent an efficiency-
reducing price distortion, interest rates can be distorted upwards.  A real interest rate that 
persists for several years in excess of the long term sustainable rate of per capita growth 
is a price distortion.17  Again, one discovers an economically undesirably convergence in 
the sub-region, of real interest rates moving into a growth depressing range.  This 
convergence of real interest rates towards distorted and economically irrational levels 
might partly explain the persistence of low investment rates in the sub-region. 
Despite the recessionary consequence of choosing a low numerical target and 
attempting to achieve it in the context of severe and systematic random shocks, many 
external assistance agencies vigorously defend the policy of inflation reduction through 
inappropriate interest rates.  The defence is that ‘inflation is bad for the poor’; therefore, 
inflation targeting is ‘good for the poor’.  This allegation appears repeatedly in IMF and 
World Bank documents.  There is little evidence to support it.  In one of the few 
empirical studies of the distributional impact of inflation, Galli and van der Hoeven found 
that ‘[t]hough in high inflation countries restrictive monetary policy is often beneficial for 
inequality, reducing inflation in economies with initially low inflation might increase 
inequality’ (Galli and van der Hoeven 2001). 
 
III.6  Countries of the Region and SADC Convergence Targets 
 As part of their preparation for further economic integration, the members of the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) established targets for 
macroeconomic indicators (Jefferis 2008).  These targets are presented in Table 14.  Of 
the countries under review, eight were SADC members, with Angola, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Namibia, Mauritius and Madagascar not among them.  A review of 
previous tables shows that few countries achieved a majority of targets for 2008, and at 
least one target was achieved by none of the countries (the investment-GDP ratio).  
Assessment of the likelihood of achieving the targets for 2018 would be extremely 
speculative.  The relative proximity of 2012 makes it relevant to consider the likelihood 
of the specified convergence targets, for both the SADC members and non-members. 
                                                 
17 In long term equilibrium the rate of return on capital should equal the real interest rate, which 
in turn should equal the rate of per capita growth.  See Swan (1956). 
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 On the basis of the outcomes for 2000-2007, three of the countries achieved half 
or more of the targets, Botswana (3), Tanzania (5) and Uganda (4).  The indicators for the 
two most frequently achieved targets, the fiscal deficit and the current account deficit, 
include development assistance.  Excluding development assistance, none of the low 
income countries could be on target.  The two least achieved targets included the most 
important, the GDP growth rate, met only by Mozambique and Tanzania, with the later 
country a bit below, but quite close.  It is clear that the failure to meet the growth target 
by eleven countries was in great part the result of no country coming close to the 
investment target.  The likelihood of meeting the investment target would be reduced by 
the attempts to achieve the deficit targets too quickly, for low deficits would require 
fiscal restraint if not contraction.  In all the countries reaching a thirty percent investment 
share would require increased public investment designed to ‘crowd-in’ private 
investment.  Low deficit targets would greatly constrain the fiscal space for public 
investment. 
 The principle of convergence of macro indicators would be necessary for regional 
integration, especially when that integration includes monetary union.  However, the 
macro targets should be established consistent with the growth outcome among the 
countries, and it is not clear that this consistency was rigorously established.  Further, 
establishing a common target for all countries is unlikely to be appropriate.  It is clear 
from the discussion above that the various countries have different internal dynamics, 
notably in their structural inflationary pressures, trade elasticities and determinants of 
domestic investment. 
 
IV.  Policies for Sustained Growth and Poverty Reduction 
 
IV.1  Policy Framework 
 This paper concludes with a specification of macro policies appropriate for the 
complementary goals of economic stability, sustained and rapid growth, faster poverty 
reduction, and outcome convergence for further regional integration.  A rigorous 
specification of pro-poor policies by country requires a careful analysis of the structural 
parameters of each economy.  For example, the implementation and effectiveness of 
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monetary policy would be considerably different in South Africa with its developed 
financial intermediation than in most of the low income countries of the region.  In the 
low income countries the market for government securities is extremely narrow, limited 
in practice to purchases and sales to a few banks.  The recommendations that follow offer 
general guidelines, rather than recommendations for specific countries.18   
 
IV.2  Exchange Rate Policy  
The appropriate exchange rate regime for promoting pro-poor economic openness 
would be one in which the government purposefully intervenes in the foreign exchange 
market with clear medium term objectives, export promotion and exchange rate stability.  
There are several advantages of this regime over a ‘floating’ rate with only crisis 
interventions.  First, the view that economies have a unique, market-determined exchange 
rate which strikes the correct balance between tradables and non-tradables is incorrect in 
practice.  A substantial portion of a country’s foreign exchange flows may not be market 
related (development assistance and debt service), so that the so-called market rate would 
not reflect the appropriate relative price of tradables even in theory.  Second, the practical 
goal of export promotion is achieved through devaluation, lowering the foreign currency 
price of a country’s exports.  If the inflationary effect of the devaluation is contained, the 
purpose should be achieved in the short run.  However, if the trading regime is a liberal 
one, as in most sub-Saharan countries, the domestic currency price of exportables will 
slowly approach the international price (the so-called Law of One Price).  Because of the 
lag in the price adjustment, periodic nominal devaluations are needed maintain a wedge 
between the export price in domestic currency and the world price.  Third, with a floating 
exchange rate, periods of rising export prices will tend to generate appreciation, 
undermining export promotion. 
A final, extremely important comment is required on exchange rates.  At the 
beginning of this section we pointed out that the IMF was created to oversee a system of 
fixed exchange rates.  The principal purpose of the system was to prevent the recurrence 
of the competitive devaluations of the 1930s that had destabilized international trade.  In 
the current imperfect world, governments in sub-Saharan countries have little choice but 
                                                 
18 For more detail, see Weeks and McKinley (2007) and Weeks and Patel (2007). 
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to pursue an exchange rate policy that fundamentally represents a regime of under-cutting 
its regional neighbours, who export many of the same commodities.  In the long term this 
fallacy of composition problem may be reduced by export diversification.19  In the short 
and medium term one must frankly concede the likelihood of fallacy of composition 
effects from any exchange rate policy, even one that is part of a pro-poor macro policy. 
 
IV.3  Fiscal Policy  
 The fiscal policy stance in a pro-poor strategy is determined, first of all, by the 
need to achieve rapid, sustained, broad-based and employment-intensive growth.20 
Growth-accommodating fiscal policies will help to stimulate the economy, ensure that 
growth is led by pro-poor sectors, and secure the achievement of the desired distributive 
outcomes. Rapid growth plays a more prominent role in pro-poor strategies than in 
orthodox programmes.  However, in order to play these roles pro-poor policies must be 
bolder and more expansionary than what is permissible under an orthodox strategy. This 
includes, at an absolute minimum, the counter-cyclical use of the fiscal budget; in 
contrast, the orthodoxy normally wishes to limit the fiscal deficit to arbitrarily low levels 
throughout the economic cycle: 
[T]the central aim of fiscal policy should be to help achieve the high quality and 
quantity growth rates that are needed … [T]ax and expenditure policies should be 
based on their ability to promote growth, redistribution, poverty reduction and 
employment creation. The temptation to achieve a balanced budget must be 
                                                 
19 Fallacy of composition refers to the possibility that what seems true for one producer (a lower 
price increases sales) may not be true if all producers take the same measure. 
20 ‘[I]f an economy’s growth path does not create sufficient jobs or livelihood opportunities, 
people are deprived of more than a livelihood. They are also robbed of opportunities to develop 
their abilities, thereby undermining their dignity and self-respect. Thus a successful growth model 
must also ensure appropriate investment in the development of human capabilities, and match 
people’s capabilities with productive and properly rewarded employment opportunities. Since 
these outcomes are not necessarily direct consequences of a market economy, specific policy 
measures are required to ensure that economic growth embodies qualities that result in human 
progress. These qualities and outcomes cannot be ‘added on’ to a conventional economic reform 
package; rather, an integrated and consistent long-term policy framework is needed. This will 
encourage the achievement of economic growth through diverse forms of investments (e.g. public 
and private investments in physical and human capital) and redistribution (e.g. land)’ (UNDP 
2003, p.170). 
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tempered by the immediate and long-term growth and development implications. 
(UNDP 2003, 196)  
 Essential to such a policy is raising revenue.  In the most constrained 
circumstances, countries with low incomes, few mineral resources and no substantial 
presence of foreign companies, this must be done through trade taxes, particularly import 
taxes. 
 
IV.4  Monetary Policy  
 Liberated from the straight-jacket of inflation targeting, monetary policy could 
contribute to pro-poor growth.  Used as the major instrument for macro management, 
monetary policy can do little to make growth pro-poor.  However, in support of an 
expansionary fiscal policy it can indirectly foster growth that is pro-poor.  As a general 
rule, if inflationary pressures are weak, this support would take the form of positive but 
low real interest rates and an expanding monetary supply.     
While these seem simple guidelines, foster growth and counter inflation when 
necessary, their application in the sub-region countries is not straight-forward and varies 
across countries.  In most of the countries of the region, financial markets are 
underdeveloped.  Indeed, in a few countries, the monetization of the economy is low.   
The concrete result of underdeveloped financial markets is that governments find it 
difficult or impossible to sell their bonds to private agents.  This explains the common 
practice in the region of legislation that requires commercial banks to hold a portion of 
their reserves in government bonds.  In practice this requirement has tended to have an 
anti-poor bias (Saad Filho 2005, Weeks et. al. 2007).  The narrow bond market also 
implies that deficit spending, if financed domestically, tends to be covered by 
monetization (selling bonds to the central bank). 
Wisely or unwisely, most sub-Saharan governments have granted autonomy for 
central banks to make decisions about the policy instruments which are within their 
mandate.  The most used instrument in the hands of the central bank is the rate at which it 
lends money to commercial banks, often loosely called ‘the interest rate’.  Manipulating 
this rate is alleged to be an effective manner in which to achieve two policy outcomes, 
price stability and exchange rate stability.  It would achieve price stability by: 1) 
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provoking a commensurate change in the commercial bank lending rate; 2) that this 
would lower or raise the cost of borrowing;  3) a change in the cost of borrowing would 
increase or decrease the demand for credit;  and 4) then, the supply of money would 
adjust to the demand.  The alleged mechanism for stabilizing the exchange rate is more 
direct:  1) provoking a commensurate change in the commercial bank deposit rate; and 2) 
this attracts or repels foreign capital deposits, which by definition increases or decrease 
foreign exchange reserves. 
These mechanisms do not operate effectively in most countries in the region 
(South Africa is the exception).   The amount of commercial lending for fixed investment 
is typically low, allegedly for risk reasons.  More often the lack of interest in lending for 
productive investment is because the high returns on government paper (due in great part 
to inflation targeting), and the faster turnover of loans to finance imports and exports.  
Therefore, attempts to stimulate private investment by lower interest rates are unlikely to 
have a substantial impact.  Further, many countries are characterized by enormous 
spreads between the central bank rate and the commercial lending rate (and between 
lending and deposit rates.  As a result, to induce commercial lending rates down to a level 
to stimulate investment is not feasible, perhaps requiring negative nominal central bank 
rates.  Finally, most private productive investment is not financed through the 
commercial banking system either because it is by small operators, both rural and urban, 
or because foreign investors raise their funds abroad where interest rates are lower. 
The limited ability of the central bank to stimulate investment does not imply 
there is no pro-poor role for the central bank rate.  Lower central bank rates would have 
two pro-poor effects:  1) government bonds are held by the wealthy, or the institutions of 
the wealthy, so lowering rates has a positive impact on income distribution;  and 2)  
lower rates imply a smaller domestic debt service in the public budget, producing ‘fiscal 
space’ for pro-poor government expenditure.   
Allowing the money supply to expand faster than real output can also have a pro-
poor impact, by increasing access to credit in ‘informal’ financial markets.21  It also 
                                                 
21 While the term ‘informal’ is almost invariably used to refer to all borrowing and lending 
activities outside the commercial financial system, it is a misnomer, because these activities are 
quite formalized in terms of behaviour.  More accurate would be the dichotomy ‘regulated’ and 
‘unregulated’. 
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encourages financial ‘deepening’; i.e., the ratio of the money supply to aggregate output, 
which is typically low in sub-Saharan countries.  Money supply management raises the 
question of what instruments would be used to counter inflationary pressures, if these 
became a serious policy concern.  The key policy issue is what constitutes ‘a serious 
concern’.   Cross-country regressions suggest that inflation is uncorrelated with growth 
for the rates that characterize sub-Saharan countries (Easterly & Bruno 1998); i.e., rates 
below forty percent.  Therefore, if growth and poverty reduction are the goals, a tolerance 
for moderate inflation is required.  This is especially the case because due to the 
weakness of financial markets, the only effective instrument for reducing inflation in 
most countries would be fiscal contraction. 
In summary, a pro-poor monetary policy requires low real interest rates, a 
tolerance for moderate inflation rates, and an expansion of the money supply that 
accommodates growth and financial deepening.  To achieve these outcomes, it is 
probably the case that it would be more pro-poor to finance prudent fiscal deficits by 




 Table 1: Growth rates for 13 East, Central and Southern African countries, 1980-2007 
 GDP   GDP per capita  
Country 1980-89 1990-99 2000-07 1980-89 1990-99 2000-07 
Botswana 11.5 6.1 5.5 7.9 3.5 3.9 
Burundi 4.3 -1.4 2.4 1.0 -3.1 -1.0 
Kenya 4.2 2.2 4.0 .5 -.7 1.3 
Lesotho 3.6 4.0 3.6 1.3 2.3 2.6 
Malawi 1.7 4.1 2.7 -2.4 1.9 .1 
Mozambique .4 5.1 7.4 -.6 2.2 4.9 
Rwanda 3.2 2.1 5.6 -.5 .2 2.4 
South Africa 2.2 1.4 4.3 -.3 -.8 2.7 
Swaziland 6.8 3.8 2.4 3.6 .6 .7 
Tanzania 3.8 3.1 6.5 .6 .2 3.6 
Uganda 3.0 6.9 5.7 -.5 3.4 2.5 
Zambia 1.4 .4 4.9 -1.7 -2.2 2.9 
Zimbabwe 5.2 2.6 -5.6 1.4 .5 -6.8 
average (all) 4.0 3.1 3.8 .8 .6 1.5 
middle income 6.0 3.8 4.0 3.1 1.4 2.5 
low income* 2.8 2.8 4.9 -.5 .2 2.1 
*Excludes Zimbabwe. 





Table 2: Per capita GDP for 13 East, Central and Southern African  
countries, 1980-2007 (measured in 2000 US$) 
Country 1980s 1990s 2000s
Botswana 1685 2768 4040
South Africa 3324 2993 3239
Swaziland 1035 1317 1354
Lesotho 309 425 478
Zimbabwe 613 632 491
Kenya 426 423 415
Zambia 417 332 337
Tanzania 256 256 296
Mozambique 179 198 282
Uganda 167 199 257
Rwanda 272 229 241
Malawi 146 141 139
Burundi 145 130 104
Average (all) 690 773 898
Middle income 1588 1876 2278
low income 291 282 285
Note:  Figures in bold for 2000s indicate that per capita GDP 
was lower than in one or both previous decades. 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2008 
(website) and IMF 2008h. 
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Table 3a: US one dollar a day poverty and the Gini coefficient for 13 East, Central and 
Southern African countries, various years 
  US$1 a day Poverty  Gini Coefficient 
country year WB OECD year WB OECD 
Botswana 1993, 2003 31 23 1993, 2003 63 57 
Burundi 1998, 2006 55 48 1998, 2006 33 50 
Kenya 1997, 1997 23 23 1997, 2000 43 42 
Lesotho 1995, 1995 36 36 1995, 2002 63 52 
Malawi 1997, 2004 42 21 1997, 2004 50 39 
Mozambique 1996, 1996 38 38 1996, 2003 40 42 
Rwanda 1999, 2005 52 57 1984, 2005 29 51 
South Africa 2000, 2000 11 11 2000, 2000 58 58 
Swaziland 1994, 2000 8 48 1994, 2001 61 50 
Tanzania 1993, 1993 20 58 1993, 2000 38 38 
Uganda 1999, 2005 85 32 1999, 2005 43 41 
Zambia 1998, 2004 64 64 1998, 2004 53 51 
Zimbabwe 1995, 2004 56 62 1995, 2004 57 50 
Average, All  40 40  48 48 
middle income  21 30  61 54 
low income  48 45  42 46 
Probably means are equal .01 .09  .00 .00 
Note: Substantial differences between sources shown in bold. 




Table 3b: Growth rates for poverty reduction by half by 2015, East, Central  
and Southern African countries 
country 1990 2006 2002-07 2007-15 Growth Gap 
Botswana 2483 4423 3.6 1.3 -2.3 
Mozambique 193 330 5.3 5.1 -.2 
Uganda 172 275 2.4 2.5 .1 
Lesotho 376 528 3.0 3.8 .8 
Tanzania 257 324 3.8 5.1 1.3 
South Africa 3152 3562 3.2 6.6 3.4 
Rwanda 244 262 2.9 6.7 3.8 
Zambia 373 371 3.1 8.0 4.9 
Malawi 132 145 .9 6.8 5.9 
Swaziland 1330 1401 1.2 7.4 6.2 
Kenya 450 440 1.4 8.4 7.0 
Burundi 152 102 -.8 12.9 13.7 
Zimbabwe 642 390 -6.5 13.4 19.9 
Average, All 776 1014 2.5 6.2 3.7 
Middle income 1835 2479 2.8 4.8 2.0 
Low income* 247 281 2.4 7.0 4.6 
Percent increase per capita Level Growth Rate   
All  26.5 1.7   
Middle income  29.8 1.9   
Low income*  13.0 .8   
*Excludes Zimbabwe. Note:  Figures in bold for 2000s indicate that per capita GDP was lower 




Table 4: Exports, share of GDP, 13 East, Central  
and Southern African countries, 1980-2007 
Country 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Botswana 62.0 51.2 47.0 
Burundi 10.4 9.0 8.7 
Kenya 25.7 27.6 24.3 
Lesotho 16.7 21.7 48.7 
Malawi 23.7 25.1 25.3 
Mozambique 6.8 12.8 31.0 
Rwanda 10.4 6.0 9.0 
South Africa 28.8 23.5 29.3 
Swaziland 70.2 74.8 79.9 
Tanzania nd 16.4 18.2 
Uganda 11.6 9.8 13.2 
Zambia 34.4 32.8 31.5 
Zimbabwe 21.4 34.1 27.9 
Average, All 26.8 26.5 30.3 
Middle Income 44.4 42.8 51.2 
Low Income* 17.5 17.4 20.1 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2008 
(website) and IMF 2008h.  Without Mozambique the 
average for the 2000s is 18.6. 
 
 
Table 5: Imports, share of GDP, 13 East, Central  
and Southern African countries, 1980-2007 
Country 1980s 1990s 2000s
Botswana 56.7 41.5 33.2 
Burundi 23.8 23.4 32.6 
Kenya 30.6 30.3 31.9 
Lesotho 122.1 116.5 103.8 
Malawi 30.4 39.4 40.7 
Mozambique 25.1 36.4 44.3 
Rwanda 20.7 26.0 26.4 
South Africa 23.8 20.7 28.7 
Swaziland 93.7 93.9 87.7 
Tanzania nd 35.6 28.4 
Uganda 17.8 21.6 27.1 
Zambia 36.5 38.4 39.3 
Zimbabwe 22.2 36.7 31.3 
Average, All 41.9 43.1 42.7 
Middle Income 74.0 68.2 63.3 
Low Income 26.4 31.4 33.8 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2008 






Table 6: Trade Balances, share of GDP, 13 East, Central  
and Southern African countries, 1980-2007 
Country 1980s 1990s 2000s
Botswana 5.3 9.7 13.9 
Burundi -13.5 -14.4 -16.7 
Kenya -4.9 -2.7 -8.2 
Lesotho -105.4 -94.8 -54.7 
Malawi -6.7 -14.3 -15.5 
Mozambique -18.4 -23.6 -13.1 
Rwanda -10.3 -19.9 -17.3 
South Africa 5.1 2.8 .9 
Swaziland -23.5 -19.1 -7.8 
Tanzania nd -19.3 -10.4 
Uganda -6.2 -11.7 -13.3 
Zambia -2.1 -5.6 -6.8 
Zimbabwe -.8 -2.6 -3.2 
Average, All -15.1 -16.6 -11.7 
Middle Income -29.6 -25.4 -11.9 
Low Income -7.8 -12.7 -11.6 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2008 





Table 7: Current Account Balances, share of GDP, with and without ODA, 13 East,  
Central and Southern African countries, 1980-2007 
 with ODA  without ODA  
Country 1980s 1990s 2000s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Botswana .2 7.1 10.0 -8.3 4.8 8.6 
Burundi -4.5 -3.0 -7.7 -17.1 -22.7 -43.0 
Kenya -4.9 -2.1 -1.5 -12.7 -10.7 -4.9 
Lesotho 2.8 -10.6 -11.9 -11.3 -19.5 -17.6 
Malawi -8.8 -8.7 -5.1 -25.7 -35.6 -23.2 
Mozambique -12.6 -16.3 -9.1 -28.4 -60.5 -36.8 
Rwanda -4.5 -3.6 -5.4 -15.2 -31.9 -27.5 
South Africa .6 .0 -2.7 .6 -.2 -2.3 
Swaziland -6.6 -1.5 .5 -12.6 -5.3 -1.2 
Tanzania nd -12.1 -4.5 -5.6 -31.4 -17.6 
Uganda -1.9 -4.8 -4.5 -8.5 -20.7 -19.8 
Zambia -12.2 -10.4 -11.9 -25.8 -36.8 -29.6 
Zimbabwe -2.0 -4.5 -4.0 -5.4 -10.7 -7.8 
All -4.5 -5.4 -4.4 -13.5 -21.7 -17.1 
Middle Income -.7 -1.2 -1.0 -7.9 -5.1 -3.1 
Low Income* -7.1 -7.6 -6.2 -17.4 -31.3 -25.3 
*Excludes Zimbabwe. 





Table 8: Foreign exchange reserves in months, 13 East,  
Central and Southern African countries, 1980-2007 
Countries 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Botswana 13.6 29.5 28.5 
Burundi 3.0 7.6 3.6 
Kenya 2.1 2.0 3.4 
Lesotho 1.3 4.2 5.3 
Malawi 1.9 2.5 2.3 
Mozambique nd nd nd 
Rwanda 4.6 3.1 6.4 
South Africa 2.0 1.7 3.0 
Swaziland 2.7 3.1 2.3 
Tanzania nd 2.3 7.1 
Uganda 1.2 3.9 7.7 
Zambia 1.5 1.7 2.3 
Zimbabwe 2.5 2.3 .9 
Average, All 3.3 4.9 5.6 
Middle Income 4.9 9.7 9.8 
Low Income* 2.4 2.9 4.1 
*Excludes Zimbabwe. 




Table 9: Total Investment, share of GDP, 13 East,  
Central and Southern African countries, 1980-2007 
Countries 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Botswana 29.0 27.2 20.4 
Burundi 16.1 9.0 9.9 
Kenya 18.3 17.6 17.3 
Lesotho 39.5 57.0 39.4 
Malawi 15.8 15.2 17.3 
Mozambique 12.2 20.7 22.8 
Rwanda 14.4 14.5 19.4 
South Africa 23.1 16.3 16.1 
Swaziland 25.4 20.5 18.3 
Tanzania nd 21.0 18.1 
Uganda 8.5 16.1 20.8 
Zambia 16.1 14.6 23.1 
Zimbabwe 16.0 20.1 14.3 
Average, All 19.5 20.7 19.8 
Middle Income 29.2 30.2 23.6 
Low Income* 14.5 16.1 18.6 
*Excludes Zimbabwe. 







Table 10: Public revenue, share of GDP, without ODA,  
13 East,  Central and Southern African countries, 1992-2007 
countries 1992-95 1996-99 2000-03 2004-07 
Botswana 44.2 42.5 42.0 38.7 
Burundi 17.4 15.6 20.1 19.2 
Kenya 27.6 25.9 20.5 20.8 
Lesotho 34.4 42.5 41.3 54.4 
Malawi 17.3 16.8 17.3 18.0 
Mozambique 10.8 11.3 12.9 14.9 
Rwanda 7.3 9.8 11.4 12.9 
South Africa 22.1 23.7 23.3 25.9 
Swaziland 29.3 29.7 26.0 35.6 
Tanzania 12.1 12.1 10.3 11.8 
Uganda 9.6 11.4 11.4 13.0 
Zambia 18.8 19.3 18.1 17.9 
Zimbabwe 25.1 31.1 27.9 33.2 
Average, All 21.2 22.4 21.7 24.3 
Middle Income 32.5 34.6 33.2 38.6 
Low Income* 14.8 15.1 15.0 15.8 
*Excludes Zimbabwe. 
Sources:  World Development Indicators 2008 and  IMF 2008h. 
 
 
Table 11: Fiscal Balances, share of GDP, with and without ODA, 13 East,  Central and 
Southern African countries, 1992-2007 
 with ODA   without ODA   
Country 1992-95 1996-99 2000-03 2004-07 1992-95 1996-99 2000-03 2004-07 
Botswana 5.5 3.3 -.4 6.6 4.5 2.7 -.5 6.1 
Burundi -3.9 -6.8 -2.8 -1.9 -9.3 -7.3 -7.9 -19.2 
Kenya -4.4 -1.0 -2.5 -1.9 -5.6 -1.6 -4.2 -3.0 
Lesotho 2.9 -3.6 -1.5 9.7 -.5 -6.5 -4.3 7.6 
Malawi -1.5 -4.8 -7.6 -2.5 -16.2 -10.1 -15.3 -14.6 
Mozambique -6.3 -2.9 -6.1 -3.4 -24.2 -13.2 -16.2 -13.1 
Rwanda -7.8 -3.7 -.9 -.2 -12.8 -10.0 -9.5 -11.9 
South Africa -6.8 -3.2 -1.8 -.2 -6.8 -3.2 -1.8 -.2 
Swaziland -3.6 .1 -2.6 .9 -4.5 -.6 -3.8 .1 
Tanzania -3.5 -.9 -1.6 -3.5 -6.4 -4.7 -6.3 -8.9 
Uganda -3.2 -3.7 -4.5 -1.4 -9.5 -8.8 -11.2 -8.8 
Zambia -4.7 -5.4 -6.4 3.1 -12.9 -11.8 -13.0 -7.4 
Zimbabwe -7.6 -11.7 -6.2 -8.4 -9.4 -12.8 -8.0 -8.4 
All -3.5 -3.4 -3.4 -.2 -8.7 -6.8 -7.8 -6.3 
Middle Income -.5 -.8 -1.6 4.3 -1.8 -1.9 -2.6 3.4 
Low Income* -4.4 -3.6 -4.0 -1.4 -12.1 -8.4 -10.5 -10.9 
*Excludes Zimbabwe. 







Table 12: Inflation rates, 13 East,  Central and Southern African countries, 1980-2007 
Country 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-07 
Botswana 12.1 9.6 12.8 8.7 7.9 9.1 
Burundi 8.6 5.7 8.5 18.5 10.2 8.2 
Kenya 13.6 10.0 28.0 6.8 7.8 11.5 
Lesotho 13.9 13.9 13.6 10.6 8.4 5.8 
Malawi 13.8 19.2 21.1 40.9 17.6 12.5 
Mozambique 13.1 63.5 46.2 22.9 12.9 9.4 
Rwanda 7.6 1.8 12.6 14.9 5.8 9.1 
South Africa 13.5 15.7 12.4 7.3 5.5 5.0 
Swaziland 14.8 15.1 11.1 8.0 8.2 6.1 
Tanzania 29.6 30.5 28.9 17.2 3.1 7.4 
Uganda 56.2 155.2 25.9 5.9 3.1 7.2 
Zambia 12.4 63.7 121.7 30.7 21.8 12.7 
Zimbabwe 14.5 11.1 26.5 30.6 197.3 3966.3 
Average, All 17.4 33.7 28.6 16.1 9.4 8.7 
Middle income 13.5 13.6 12.5 8.7 7.5 6.5 
Low income 19.4 43.7 36.6 19.7 10.3 9.8 
low group 10.9 9.2 17.5 20.3 10.3 10.3 
high group 27.8 78.2 55.7 19.2 10.2 9.2 
Notes: Consumer price index. Averages exclude Zimbabwe. 
‘low group’ includes Burundi, Kenya, Malawi and Rwanda. 
‘high group’ includes Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. 
Source:  World Development Indicators 2008  and IMF 2008h. 
 
Table 13: Price deflated lending rates, 13 East,  Central  
and Southern African countries, 1980-2007 
Countries 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Botswana -.2 4.2 7.5 
Burundi 6.8 4.9 8.5 
Kenya 4.5 10.0 10.6 
Lesotho .7 6.8 8.3 
Malawi 3.0 4.0 14.9 
Mozambique nd 16.3 12.1 
Rwanda 9.1 7.0 10.2 
South Africa .8 7.2 5.6 
Swaziland 4.1 4.0 3.7 
Tanzania 8.6 8.2 8.9 
Uganda -35.9 11.2 12.2 
Zambia -12.2 -1.4 10.9 
Zimbabwe 5.4 4.4 -19.3 
Average, All -.4 6.7 7.2 
Middle Income 1.3 5.6 6.3 
Low Income -2.3 7.5 11.0 
low Y (exc Ug,Zmbw) 3.3 7.0 10.9 
Standard deviation    
All 12.5 4.3 8.5 
Middle Income 1.89 1.69 2.07 
Low Income* 16.50 5.29 2.05 
*Excludes Zimbabwe. 
Source:  World Development Indicators 2008. 
 38
 
Table 14:  SADC Macroeconomic Convergence Targets 
year 
indicators 2008 2012 2018
Inflation rate 9.5 5 3
Fiscal Deficit/GDP -5 -3 -1
Current account deficit/GDP -9 -9 -3
GDP growth 7 7 7
External reserves* 3 6 6
Domestic investment/GDP 30 30 30
*Months of import cover. 
Source: Jefferis 2008, 9. 
 
Table 15:  Country Performance during 2000s and SADC Targets for 2012 
Country Inflation FD/GDP CAD/GDP GDP Ext Res I/GDP Summary 
Target 5 -3 -9 7 6 30  
Botswana  8.4 2.2 10 5.5 29 20 3/6 
Target ratio 1.7   .8  .7  
Burundi 9.5 -2.5 -8 2.4 4 10 1/6 
Target ratio 1.9  .9 .3 .7 .3  
Kenya 9.2 -2.3 -2 4 3 17 1/6 
Target ratio 1.8  .2 .6 .5 .6  
Lesotho  7.4 2.7 -12 3.6 5 39 1/6 
Target ratio 1.5  1.3 .5 .8 1.3  
Malawi  15.7 -5.7 -5 2.7 2 17 1/6 
Target ratio 3.1 1.9  .4 .3 .6  
Mozambique  11.6 -5.1 -9 7.4 nd 23 2/6 
Target ratio 2.3 1.7   na .8  
Rwanda 7 -0.6 -5 5.6 6 19 2/6 
Target ratio 1.4   .8 1.0 .6  
South Africa 5.3 -1.2 -3 4.3 3 16 2/6 
Target ratio   .3 .6 .5 .5  
Swaziland 7.4 -1.3 1 2.4 2 18 2/6 
Target ratio 1.5   .3 .3 .6  
Tanzania 4.7 -2.3 -4 6.5 7 18 5/6 
Target ratio      .6  
Uganda 4.6 -3.3 -4 5.7 7 21 4/6 
Target ratio    .8  .7  
Zambia 18.4 -2.8 -12 4.9 2 23 1/6 
Target ratio 3.7  1.3 .7 .3 .8  
Zimbabwe 1611 -7.0 -4 -5.6 1 14 0/6 
Target ratio 322.2 2.3 .4 -.8 .2 .5  
Summary* 3/12 10/12 7/12 2/12 3/12 0/12  
*Excludes Zimbabwe. 
Countries in bold are SADC members. 
FD/GDP – fiscal deficit as percentage of GDP 
CAD/GDP – current account deficit as percentage of GDP 
Ext Res – external reserves in months of import cover 
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 Figure: 5 
Import share in GDP for 13 East, Central and Southern 
































  Figure: 6 
Trade balance, share in GDP for 13 East, Central and 





































Current account balance, with and without ODA, 13 East, 
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  Figure: 8 
Foreign Exchange Reserves in months, 13 East, Central 


































































 Figure: 10 
Total revenue excluding ODA, share of GDP, 12 East, Central 








































Fiscal Deficit including ODA, share of GDP, 12 East, Central 




































  Figure: 12 
Fiscal Deficit excluding ODA, share of GDP, 12 East, Central 
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